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1  Political  commentators  have got  used to calling Scottish Parliament election results
historic and if the last election unusually failed to obtain such an epithet, its outcome was
nonetheless surprising as it saw the Conservative party rise to second place and push
back Labour to third position. Although the SNP failed to repeat its 2011 achievement and
obtain an overall  majority  in  spite  of  a  semi-proportional  electoral  system explicitly
designed to prevent  such an outcome,  it  comfortably managed to win 63 out  of  the
Scottish Parliament’s total 129 seats. Incumbent First Minister and SNP leader, Nicola
Sturgeon,  was  thus  confident  enough  to  form  a  minority  government  as  had  her
predecessor, Alex Salmond, in 2007. There was scant evidence to support the idea of a
different  outcome  before  the  election  and  the  SNP’s  victory  was  widely  expected,
especially after it had wiped out all the unionist parties at the May 2015 general election,
leaving them with a single seat each. The stakes of the election therefore unusually rested
not on the winning party but on that of the main party of opposition. 
2 Labour’s painful electoral demise in its former Scottish stronghold and the relentless rise
to power of the SNP have been strong indicators of the shifting grounds of the post-
devolution Scottish political landscape. Yet, voting for the Conservative party in Scotland
had become somewhat anathema to most Scots since the Thatcher era and the Tories
were for long reduced to a “political comic punchline” to use the words of former Scottish
Conservative  leader  Annabel  Goldie.1 The  May  2016  Scottish  Parliament  election,
however, saw the resurgence of the Conservatives in Scotland after they obtained a total
of 31 seats (with 22% of the constituency vote and 7 constituency seats, and 22.9% of the
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regional vote and 24 regional seats), that is sixteen more seats than previously held. In
contrast, Labour’s scores fell to 22.6% of the constituency vote and 3 seats, and 19.1% of
the regional vote and 21 regional seats, losing a total of 13 seats overall. Clearly, the battle
was held over the regional ballot. The political strength displayed by the SNP at the May
2015 general election served as a good indicator for the constituency ballot’s predicted
outcome as it is also held under the first-past-the-post system and therefore shifted the
focus of the election to the party which would win the most regional seats under the
Additional Member System used for the regional ballot. Voters therefore had to choose
between a party that would help the SNP deliver their programme in government and
maybe push it  towards more radical  reforms,  or,  crucially,  a strong opposition party
which would dampen some of the SNP’s legislative programme and resist its impetus for
constitutional reform. It is worth wondering then to what extent the constitutional issue
was the determining factor in the rise of Ruth Davidson’s Scottish Conservative party as
the second party of Scotland and how this contributed to Labour’s further downfall. We
shall see that the campaign reflected the parties’ recognition that the post-independence
referendum electoral debate in Scotland is no longer defined along traditional left/right
political lines but a divide between unionism and nationalism. A comparative perspective
on  Labour  and  the  Conservative  Party’s  attitude  to  devolution  and  post-devolution
Scottish politics will  shed light on the electoral  demise of  the former and the rising
fortunes of the latter. This paper therefore seeks to examine the main unionist parties’
differences in terms of structural and ideological adaptation to devolution within the
broad centre-left consensus that characterizes the current Scottish political landscape. 
 
Multi-level party politics organization and regional
advocacy
3  The literature on federal and regionalized systems points to the significant role of parties
in managing and alleviating conflict between state and sub-state levels. While a party
may act as a centralizing force within a federal or regionalized system and reduce the
diversifying  impact  of  decentralization  as  is  the  case  in  the  United  States2,  political
parties operating in a territorially differentiated governmental system more often than
not experience a degree of decentralization themselves.3 Indeed, political parties within
federal governmental systems, such as the SPD in Germany for instance, generally tend to
be modelled along decentralized, federal structures, with substantial powers resting with
regional  branches.4 This  is  often the case as state and sub-state elections tend to be
treated differently by voters: sub-state elections can be considered to express views on
regional  interests  and  identities,  and  dual  voting  patterns  in  terms  of  turnout  and
outcome are frequent. The level of dissimilarity between state and sub-state elections can
either result from the strong autonomy of a region’s political arena or pronounced anti-
government  swings  (which  would  indicate  that  national  politics  still  dominated  the
regional elections). In fact, the level of dissimilarity between Scottish Parliament and UK
general elections has noticeably risen since devolution was first introduced in 1999. While
Labour was still in power in Westminster and with the Blair and Brown governments
becoming  increasingly  unpopular  over  time,  the  level  of  dissimilarity  between
Westminster and the Holyrood elections in 2007 might have reflected a degree of anti-
government voting. Yet, studies of the 2007 campaign have stressed that Scottish issues
outweighed UK-wide issues, in particular the incumbent Scottish government’s record
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and leadership as well as the advocacy of Scottish interests in British and EU politics.5
Many  studies  have  emphasized  the  electoral  saliency  of  parties  being  considered  to
further Scotland’s distinctive interests6 and given the fact that the SNP is the only party
in  Scotland  with  no  UK-wide  counterpart  which  considers  its  support  of  Scotland’s
interests as its main raison d’être, it is no wonder then that it should score well on this
criterion. 
4 Although  socio-economic  issues  along  a  left-right  continuum  dominate  Westminster
elections, Holyrood elections combine both partisan and territorial dimensions. Indeed,
the territorial dimension of party competition appears to cut across the partisan divide
and dominate Scottish Parliament elections. This would appear to indicate the emergence
of a more autonomous sphere of sub-state party competition in Scotland, driven by the
enhanced policy scope of its devolved Parliament.7 Yet, interestingly, the 2015 and 2016
election  results  have  appeared  to  close  the  gap  between  Westminster  and  Holyrood
elections  and  indicate  the  disappearance  of  dual  voting  patterns  in  Scotland.  This
suggests that the 2014 independence referendum has imposed the territorial dimension
of party competition as the main battleground for all  elections and that the Scottish
political debate is now entirely predicated upon the constitutional issue.
5  Indeed,  although its outcome was the status quo,  the long independence referendum
campaign appears to have transformed Scottish politics on a much deeper level than
might have been expected. If the May 2015 general election results sent a clear signal of
this as it returned 56 SNP MPs to Westminster out of a total of 59, the May 2016 Scottish
Parliament election results – albeit less spectacular – are also a testimony of the profound
changes that have appeared in the Scottish political debate. The division between the
pro-independence parties led by the SNP within the Yes campaign and the three main
unionist parties sharing a single political platform within the Better Together campaign
has appeared to survive the referendum and created a new binary system centred along a
fracture between unionists and nationalists. The three partners of the Better Together
campaign represented both the left and right wings of the political spectrum, yet their
association  to  represent  a  common position  within  a  single  organization  during  the
independence referendum campaign suggests that these traditional left/right divisions
were largely made redundant when the main issue at stake was the constitutional future
of Scotland. 
6 Significantly,  while  Scottish Labour and the Scottish Conservatives  shared a  unionist
platform, their attitudes towards devolution and Scotland’s constitutional position could
hardly have been more different.  While Labour had fully participated in the Scottish
Constitutional Convention and introduced devolution under Prime Minister Tony Blair,
the Conservatives had been traditionally opposed to devolution which they considered –
maybe not entirely wrongly – as a “slippery slope to independence”. Yet a comparison of
both  parties’  structural  and  organizational  evolution  since  1999  suggests  that  they
integrated the Scottish dimension of politics differently and that this may have had an
impact on their electoral scores. While comparative studies on multi-level party politics
suggest that there is often a declining capacity of the major parties to maintain political
hegemony due not only to a proliferation of new party alternatives, as is the case in
Scotland, but also to a pluralization of political rifts with the classical functional divides
of class and religion losing saliency in structuring party competition, they also point to
regional advocacy as a central strand of sub-state party competition.8 In other words,
giving voice to Scottish concerns and defending Scottish interests has become key to
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winning an election. Yet this is more difficult for UK-wide parties such as Labour and the
Conservatives, as the more the context of governing diverges between Westminster and
Holyrood, the greater the difficulties in elaborating uniform party strategies and policy
platforms. The two main British parties therefore need to find programmatic answers to
the SNP’s demands for independence which are satisfactory to their supporters in both
Scotland and England.  As the main architect  of  devolution,  Labour may find it  more
arduous to propose a satisfactory compromise between the SNP’s independence stance
and the Conservatives’ status quo or represent a clear position within the starkly polarized
unionist-separatist  political  divide.  This  is  particularly  the  case  in  a  post-Brexit
environment as the European issue tends to polarize the debate even further.
7 Until  2007,  Labour was  in power in both London and Edinburgh and while  coalition
politics in the latter provided some degree of incongruence, partisan harmony and policy
coherence  were  facilitated  by  the  party’s  electoral  hegemony  as  well  as  a  common
political ground shared by the leaderships of both the UK and Scottish parties. Laffin et al.
note that conflicts between the UK party and the Scottish party remained rare while
Labour was in power in both Westminster and Holyrood: this could indicate either a high
degree of party consensus or the leadership’s efforts to avoid overt disagreements by
marginalising opponents, stifling contradictory demands, shaping rules or managing the
decision-making process.9 In fact, the need to respect the message and creed of British
Labour appeared paramount and the party structure remained very much centralized. 
8 After introducing devolution, Labour did take into account to at least some degree the
need to decentralize some policy-making responsibilities.  While  responsibility  for  UK
policy development was vested in the National Policy Forum, a new Scottish Policy Forum
was created in 1998 to propose and elaborate policy ideas in devolved matters which
would be subjected to the decision of the Scottish Conference and, if approved, could be
added  to  the  Scottish  manifesto.  If  the  Scottish  Conference  held  a  merely  advisory
function before devolution, it then became a sovereign body determining by a two-thirds
majority  which devolved policy  item could  form part  of  the  Scottish  Labour  party’s
programme and  perhaps  be  included  in  its  manifesto.  Yet,  the  final  drafting  of  the
manifesto remained the responsibility of a committee equally drawn from the Scottish
Executive  Committee  and  the  Scottish  Parliamentary  Labour  Group.  Far  from
representing a bottom-up approach to policy, these changes thus implied a continuous
top-down process involving the party leadership. Furthermore, reserved matters were
still  to  be  decided  by  the  national  policy  procedures  within  the  National  Executive
Committee and Scottish Labour was allowed very little input with its modest contribution
of 12 members out of a total of 180 in the National Policy Forum. Besides, although the
responsibility of candidate selection was entrusted to the Scottish Executive Committee
(SEC)  for  Holyrood selections,  the National  Executive  Committee  –  to  which the SEC
remains accountable – kept jurisdiction over all  other selections.  Finally,  the relative
autonomy of the Scottish party has been minimized by the material support of the UK
party upon which the Scottish party has become increasingly dependent in recent years
thereby tempering divergence in policy choices.10
9 This did not prevent the Scottish Labour party from pursuing a divergent political path to
that proposed by the pro-business market-oriented New Labour party in London while it
was in government. Yet this was due to Scotland’s distinct institutional landscape and to
the  new  centre-left  consensus  that  emerged  in  the  Scottish  Parliament.  While  the
Parliamentary Labour Party had to contend with the Conservative party in Westminster,
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Scottish  Labour  was  competing  with  other  centre-left  parties  over  its  left-wing
credentials.  Yet,  there were surprisingly few clashes over policy and party discipline
appeared to have prevailed. The row over free personal care to the elderly was the most
notable exception as it prevented British Labour from arguing that the policy was not
affordable and undermined the coherence of the party discourse as a whole. This was not
a straightforward conflict between the UK and Scottish parties, however, as the latter was
itself bitterly divided over the issue. In fact, a true rift emerged after former Scottish
leader Wendy Alexander called for an independence referendum in November 2007 (the
famous ‘Bring it on’ strategy), after which she was obliged to back down and failed to
obtain any support from the Labour leadership after a campaign funding scandal led her
to  resign.11 This  suggested  that  policy  divergences  were  admitted  so  long  as  they
concerned devolved matters and did not question or undermine the Labour party’s brand
politics and message. Yet, it also pointed to the inherent weakness of the Scottish Labour
party as it had to choose between the cohesive electoral message of the party as a whole
and its own electoral priorities in a different political landscape. 
10 In contrast, the Scottish Conservative Party engaged in a crucial debate on its internal
territorial structures after its defeat in the 1997 general election when it failed to win a
single  seat  in  Scotland.  Until  then,  the  Conservative  Party  had  a  very  centralized
approach to party organization. Although the Scottish Unionist Party had remained an
affiliated yet constitutionally separate party until 1965, direct authority was thereafter
exercised by the British leadership during a period which significantly coincided with a
period of sharp electoral decline.12 After 1997, the Scottish Conservative Party became an
affiliated partner of the Conservative Party and, while it participated fully in UK-wide
processes,  its  organization  and  internal  procedures,  over  which  it  gained  statutory
control, remained independently managed. The Party Constitution therefore holds that
Scottish members are obliged to follow UK party rules with respect to UK matters but will
follow Scottish party rules with respect to Scottish matters, thereby enabling the Scottish
party  to  acquire  more  autonomy  in  its  management  of  devolved  policy-making  and
organization. Moreover, if Conservative Party funding follows a similar centralist model
to that of the Labour Party, it was never as dependent as the latter on membership fees.
Indeed,  the  Conservative  Party  was  always  financed  by  individual  donors  and
corporations  foremost.  Unlike  Scottish Labour,  the  Scottish Conservatives  thus  enjoy
substantial financial support from individual sponsors.
11 After  the  1998  party  reform,  a  party  executive  committee  (Governing  Board)  and  a
Conservative  Policy  Forum  were  established.  While  the  Governing  Board  remained
responsible  for  the management of  the party,  the Forum,  which is  coordinated by a
general  council  supporting  the  local  discussion  groups  and  issuing  reports  to  the
parliamentary  party  leadership,  was  charged  with  organizing  policy  debates  and
programmatic development. However, the Forum only has an advisory character and the
elaboration of policy programmes and electoral manifestos remains largely in the hands
of the parliamentary leader and his/her inner circle. This means that while there is some
inclusion of Scottish representatives in the Board and the Forum, the extent of their
contribution to statewide policymaking depends on the national party leader.13 Yet, in
contrast with Scottish Labour, the Scottish Conservatives have enjoyed a greater degree
of autonomy with respect to devolved policies as the Scottish election manifesto emerges
from within the Scottish Conservative parliamentary group and is debated within the
Scottish constituencies and the regional party executive. The Scottish Conservatives can
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therefore develop their own proposals for Scottish matters without formal interference
by the national party leadership. This autonomy has thus enabled the Scottish party to
develop a more moderate, centrist policy profile on devolved issues in order to better
adapt to the new devolved Scottish political landscape.14 
 
Attitudes to devolution and constitutional reform
during the campaign
12 One of the main consequences of the independence referendum campaign on the May
2015 and May 2016 elections is  related to the fact  that  the referendum forced three
unlikely partners into sharing a single political platform. This uneasy partnership led the
three unionist parties to single out their own positions on the constitutional question and
define  their  vision  of  a  post-referendum  Scottish  society.  The  case  was  particularly
pressing for the Labour party whose social aspirations and ideals are broadly similar to
those of the SNP, in contrast with the clear differences that separate both parties from
the UK Conservative Party for instance, notably in terms of governance of the welfare
state.  The  debate  therefore  shifted  to  which  constitutional  settlement  would  better
preserve  these  social  ideals  against  what  is  widely  accepted  in  Scotland  as  the
Conservative Party’s relentless attacks. 
13 Labour thus set up its own Devolution Commission in 2012 charged with examining the
current state of devolution and determining what new powers should be devolved to the
Scottish Parliament. Its proposals, published in March 2014, promised to set Scottish rates
of income tax, including higher rates for high earners of at least 50p in the pound, block
cuts in business taxes and increase spending on housing. All of these became policy in the
party’s May 2016 manifesto with Kezia Dugdale’s proposal to increase income tax by 1p in
the pound and raise the income tax rate for those earning more than £150,000 from 45p
to 50p. Paradoxically, it was in terms of welfare that the Labour Devolution Commission
was least inclined to decentralize responsibilities, arguing that the welfare system was
better protected by the pooling of UK resources whilst exposing itself to heavy criticism
that it was precisely in the union that it suffered from reforms imposed by Westminster.
This would be modified in the May 2016 manifesto as Dugdale’s party advocated using the
new powers of the Scottish Parliament to protect the NHS budget and protect education
spending in real terms. In fact, Dugdale made much of the fact that the May 2016 election
would be about which party would better use the new devolved powers of the Scottish
Parliament. Yet, she repeatedly stressed that her party was “focused on using [them] to
invest in the future”, rather than “re-running the old battles of the past”, thereby indicating
her preference for the status quo and offering little if no prospects for further devolution
or a reassessment of the current constitutional set-up.
14 In the end, this position is very similar to that reached by the Scottish Conservative Party
leader Ruth Davidson. Before being narrowly elected as leader in November 2011, she
expressed her belief in a strict compliance to the status quo as she claimed that there
would be “no half-way house,  no second question – no march to  fiscal  autonomy.  When the
referendum is done, and Scotland in the Union has won the day, let that be an end to it”.15 Yet, she
was  soon forced to  change her  mind and came round to  the view that  the  Scottish
Parliament could offer an opportunity for her party, which could contribute in building a
new  Unionism  in  which  the  Conservative  party  could  prosper.  In  March  2013,  she
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conceded that “a parliament with little responsibility for raising the money it spends will never
be properly accountable to the people of Scotland. [...] So that means in future a far greater share of
the money spent by the Scottish Parliament should be raised by it”.16 A working group was set
up  to  examine  specifically  the  question  of  strengthening  devolution  and  the
accountability of the Scottish Parliament by examining its structures and the extension of
its powers over taxation. The Commission on the Future Governance of Scotland, as it was
called, published its report in May 2014 and shared some similarities with the report
published by Labour’s own Devolution Commission. Indeed, the Conservative commission
also suggested that the Scottish Parliament should become responsible for setting rates
and bands of income tax throughout Scotland but that pensions should stay within the
remit of the UK Government. The report admitted that there was a case for devolving
housing benefit and attendance allowance as well as conferring to the Scottish Parliament
the power of  supplementing benefits legislated for at  UK level.  This set  out the new
strategy later developed by the Scottish Conservatives during the May 2016 campaign as
they were able to bypass their traditional opposition to devolution and negative attitude
to  the  development  of  an  increasingly  powerful  Scottish  political  arena  which  the
Scotland Act  2016 introduced by a  Conservative government  further  enhanced.  They
advocated instead a “fresh,  positive drive to promote the benefits  of  the Union”.  The 2016
manifesto clearly indicated that the party would “not focus on the downsides of independence
– though there are many – but on the strengths and values of the Union”.17
15 Although  the  main  unionist  parties  do  not  share  a  single  vision  of  Scotland’s
constitutional future, their positions have appeared grounded in the defence of the status
quo and none of them has campaigned in the recent election for further devolution of
powers than those already devolved with the Scotland Act 2016,  leaving the fracture
between the unionist and nationalist camps intact. The new powers and responsibilities,
devolved with the Scotland Act 2016,  are the result  of  the Smith Commission set  up
immediately after the independence referendum in order to fulfil the Vow published in
the Daily Record by the three unionist leaders a few days before the referendum in which
they promised to devolve more powers from Westminster to the Scottish Parliament in
Edinburgh. Yet, these powers have been severely criticized by pro-independence parties
and political commentators alike for being too timid and falling short of the Devo Max
solution which has now appeared as the preferred constitutional option in Scotland for
several years.18 While the SNP have made much of demanding further powers than those
proposed,  the unionist  parties  have unanimously  advocated moving on.  The Scottish
Liberal-Democrats expressed in their manifesto their commitment to “move on from the
independence debate, to bring unity and healing the divisions of the referendum”.19 Likewise, the
Scottish Labour Party expressed its belief that voting to remain in the United Kingdom in
the independence referendum in 2014 was the “right decision for Scotland” and that “it is
time for both sides to move on”20 while the Scottish Conservatives claimed that “Scotland
spoke and the question should now be settled for a generation”.21 Furthermore, all three parties
rejected a second independence referendum during the campaign in case of a Brexit vote:
Labour stressed the idea that the new devolved powers meant Holyrood could “now make
different  decisions,  and  act  in  the  best  interest  of  the  people  of  Scotland”22 while  the
Conservatives accused the SNP of  breaching the Edinburgh Agreement and failing to
respect the outcome of the referendum. There was little then during the campaign to
differentiate the two main unionist parties with regard to their attitude to devolution.
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Establishment vs opposition: making the difference in
a centrist policy consensus
16 In fact, one of the most striking characteristics of the 2016 Scottish Parliament campaign
was the degree of similarity between the main parties’ manifestos and the rather large
centrist  consensus  over  policy.  Scotland’s  four  biggest  political  parties  all  proposed
increasing early years’ childcare and reducing the educational attainment gap, as well as
promising extra funding for the NHS and building more affordable housing, although
different  priorities  were  put  forward  to  achieve  these  goals.  While  Labour  and  the
Liberal-Democrats proposed to tackle the main problems related to health and education
through increased funding derived from an increase of income tax by 1p in the pound,
the Conservatives offered to bring back prescription charges and invest the money saved
in health services and new medicines as well as reinstate a graduate endowment grant for
higher education to raise £100 million by the end of the Parliament. Meanwhile, the SNP
expressed a vague commitment to use the Scottish Parliament’s new powers over tax and
social security to “expand [Scotland’s] economy and lift more people out of poverty”, yet at the
same time stressed its “belief that the NHS must remain a publicly funded service, free at the
point of use” and that it should protect free university education.23
17 In fact, taxation was perhaps the main area where the parties diverged. On the one hand,
the SNP’s tax policies would remain close to the UK’s as they offered to leave the basic
rates and additional rates of income tax at their present level, while raising the threshold
for higher rate by inflation, a policy very similar to that of the Conservatives who were
committed to complying entirely with the UK system. On the other hand, the Liberal-
Democrats and Labour were both committed to adding a penny to all tax bands. The SNP
and the Conservatives were furthermore committed to retaining the Council Tax with
moderate  amendments  while  the  Liberal-Democrats  and Labour  offered more radical
reforms and were keen to replace the Council Tax altogether with a fairer system.
18 There was little then to distinguish the unionist parties’ manifestos during the May 2016
Scottish Parliament campaign and they thus found it difficult to move away from the
constitutional  issue,  which  continued  to  dominate  the  political  debate  during  the
campaign. The fault line between both sides of the constitutional divide appeared most
clearly in the attempt made by the unionist parties to portray the SNP as a party of the
establishment in contrast with the new radical stance which each of them wished to
represent.  Labour’s  manifesto was  qualified as  “the  most  radical  manifesto  ever” by its
leader,  Kezia  Dugdale,  who  liked  to  repeat  during  the  campaign  that  she  was  “less
interested in taking selfies and more interested in taking on the establishment”. The Scottish
Labour party’s manifesto also consistently associated the SNP Government with cuts to
public and local services as well as centralization of power throughout the document in
an  attempt  to  associate  the  nationalist  Scottish  Government  with  the  Conservative
Government in Westminster as part of the wider establishment. The SNP, it claimed, had
allowed Holyrood to become “a conveyer belt for Tory cuts”. Most ironically, Conservative
Prime Minister David Cameron himself mentioned Scotland as a “one party state” at the
Scottish Conservative conference, claiming that the SNP “have been in power for nine years –
they are the establishment”. Likewise, much of the Scottish Liberal Democrats’ manifesto
was devoted to reversing “the SNP’s centralisation of Scotland”, “to roll back the top-down,
target-driven, one-size-fits-all culture that distorts our public services”.24 
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19 It is admittedly difficult to deny that the SNP, who have now indeed been in government
for nine years and currently hold a majority of Scottish MPs in Parliament, have become
the establishment. Yet the unionist parties’ strive to appear more radical than the SNP
was fundamentally flawed in two respects: the first, obviously, is that the three parties
have been themselves firmly part of the UK establishment for decades (Labour was still in
government six years ago and have a large number of peers in the House of Lords, so do
of course the two former partners of the last coalition government), and the second is
that  in  spite  of  its  domination of  Scottish politics,  the  SNP irremediably  retains  the
radical image infused by its flagship policy on Scotland’s independence. Finally, we could
add that since the electoral manifestos of Scotland’s main political parties – including the
SNP – showed that there was considerable agreement between them on many of the main
issues, the attacks brought upon the nationalists by both left and right of the political
spectrum served to stress once more that the dividing line in the Scottish political debate
was now firmly set between both sides of the constitutional issue and that the outcome of
Scottish elections no longer predicated upon the left-right continuum.
20  In fact, another clear sign of this came with the ostentatiously centrist campaign fought
by the SNP. In sharp contrast to the more radical campaigns of preceding years, the SNP
chose to triangulate when it came to new income tax powers and preferred to position
itself firmly to the centre, between the Labour party on its left and the Conservatives to
its right. The mantra of “social justice” which had pervaded the party’s discourse during
the preceding two years was conspicuous by its absence in the party’s 2016 manifesto.25
This would suggest that the constitutional issue alone was able to maintain the SNP’s
claim that  it  stood for  Scotland,  rather  than a  more left-wing positioning aiming at
reversing the deleterious effects of Conservative austerity politics in Westminster. Kezia
Dugdale’s inability to reverse her party’s electoral misfortunes in spite of her tilt to the
left and the Conservative (and Unionist) Party’s rise to second place come as further
evidence of this. Finally, although the fall in the Labour vote appears to reflect the rise in
the Conservative vote in some constituencies, it seems rather unlikely that a majority of
voters in Scotland “jumped from red to blue” and switched their vote to the Conservative
party, as Michael Keating points out.26 Not only is there differential turnout to consider,
but voting patterns suggest that rather than just benefiting from former New Labour
voters  disappointed  with  Kezia  Dugdale’s  turn  to  the  left  as  some  commentators
suggested, the Conservative party attracted centre-right voters who once supported the
Liberal  Democrats  (particularly  in  Aberdeenshire  and  Southern  Scotland).  They  also
appealed to non-nationalist SNP voters: there were considerable swings from the SNP to
the  Conservatives  in  19  SNP seats  –  including  those  of  John Swinney  and Roseanna
Cunningham – mostly in rural small-town areas where the SNP built its heartlands in the
1980s and 1990s.  Finally,  they benefited from the votes  of  re-energized Conservative
voters who had perhaps no interest in Scottish Parliament elections until it was given
taxation powers. On the other hand, Labour continued suffering swings away to the SNP
in 39 constituencies and lost seats in its former industrial powerbase in Motherwell and
Wishaw, Rutherglen, Coatbridge and Chryston, Cowdenbeath, Edinburgh Northern and
Leith,  Glasgow  Provan,  Glasgow  Maryhill  and  Springburn,  as  well  as  Greenock  and
Inverclyde.
21 Indeed, Scottish Labour tried to overcome its difficulties in two ways during the May 2016
election campaign: first by distancing itself from Westminster politics in a bid to appear
more Scottish and secondly by trying to outflank the SNP from the left. Yet, this radical
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left-wing stance met two main problems: the first, as we have seen, was the broad centre-
left welfarist consensus that dominates Scottish politics with few differences to be found
between Labour and the SNP on a wide set of issues, as both parties broadly agree on
opposing cuts to public services and protecting the welfare system, as well as supporting
a living wage. The second, is that it has emerged that the nationalists were able to capture
much  of  Labour’s  traditional  voter  base  from  the  Scottish  referendum  onwards.
According to the Ashcroft and YouGov polls of September 2014, those in working class
occupations (47% to 50%) were more likely to vote Yes than those in more middle class
jobs  (41%  to  44%).  On  average,  only  32%  of  freehold  home  owners  supported
independence compared to more than half of people who rent their property from a
council or housing association.27 Scottish Labour’s focus on an electoral base which has
already defected to the SNP rather than a middle-class unionist electorate has proved to
be a strategic error as the Scottish Conservatives and the SNP made a bid to capture it
themselves. Finally, Labour’s lack of commitment to further devolution and the wavering
opinions of its leader on the issue of independence, which Kezia Dugdale said she would
support if Scotland voted at odds with the rest of the UK during the Brexit referendum,
may have deterred staunch unionists from supporting the party.
22 In contrast, the Scottish Conservatives clearly assessed the main fault-line in Scottish
politics as they made a bid to become the main party of opposition on a unionist platform.
In fact, the term even appeared on the front cover of the Conservative manifesto and was
used as the Conservative slogan (A Strong Opposition. A Stronger Scotland.).28 This is most
unusual as Ruth Davidson appeared to indicate that she stood no chance of winning the
election and was running for opposition leader rather than First Minister. She also ran a
strong campaign matching the SNP’s personality-led slogan “Re-Elect Nicola Sturgeon” with
her own personality-centred “Ruth Davidson for a strong opposition”. In fact, an April 2016
YouGov poll for the Times showed that more respondents believed that she would make a
better  opposition  leader  (33%)  than  Kezia  Dugdale  (18%).29 Even  amongst  Labour
supporters,  only  44%  said  she  would  make  the better  opposition  leader.  Similarly,
Panelbase polls for the Sunday Times showed that more people answered that they were
satisfied with her performance as leader than with Kezia Dugdale’s.30
23 Finally, uniquely among Scotland’s unionist parties, the Scottish Conservative manifesto
was astutely based on a strong unionist message and fully acknowledged the new defining
divide in Scottish politics in the aftermath of the referendum. The Scottish Conservatives
chose to use the full name of the party (Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party) to
appear on their manifesto and all electoral material rather than the shorter version that
it habitually uses; the main headlines of the manifesto were geared towards marking the
party as a party of opposition against the SNP’s independence project31. Ruth Davidson
conceded that she would not be able to win the election and that the SNP were on course
for  another  victory,  before  matching  Nicola  Sturgeon’s  “job  application”  in  the  SNP
manifesto with her  own application for  the job of  opposition leader,  thereby clearly




24 In the end, it is the recognition that the Scottish political landscape irremediably changed
after the independence referendum that was able to raise the Conservatives from the
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ashes  in  Scotland.  Their  success  is  largely  due  to  their  astute  decision  to  voice  the
concerns of a silent majority of unionist voters in Scotland worried that a third SNP
Government with a majority in Westminster may be able to push for a second referendum
after a vote for a British exit from the EU in June 2016. In contrast, Labour’s failure to
admit that the constitutional issue now transcends the traditional left/right divisions has
further weakened it  as  a  political  force in Scotland.  It  remains to be seen,  however,
whether the Conservatives’ opposition to a second referendum vote after Brexit and their
preference for the status quo will be sufficient to meet the concerns of an electorate that
voted largely in favour of remaining in the EU. The issue will become particularly thorny
for the Scottish Conservatives as Scots are now faced with the prospect of a diminished
devolution settlement in Scotland after Prime Minister Theresa May warned that powers
heretofore vested in Europe would be repatriated to Westminster rather than Holyrood.
The increasing polarization of the constitutional divide which currently characterizes
Scottish politics as a consequence of the Brexit vote in the June 2016 referendum and the
intransigence of  the Conservative government in Westminster over the powers to be
repatriated from Europe might therefore offer an opportunity for the middle-ground
solution along more federal lines which has recently been proposed by Labour. Indeed,
the “settled will of the Scottish people” may have to find a new party to champion its
cause.
25 Fiona Simpkins is a Senior Lecturer in British contemporary history and politics at
the University Lumière of Lyon (Lyon 2). Her main areas of research are devolution,
Scottish politics and the constitutional debate in Scotland.
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ABSTRACTS
If  voting for  the Conservative party had become somewhat of  a  rarity  in Scotland since the
Thatcher era,  the May 2016 Scottish Parliament election ushered in a new era,  as it  saw the
resurgence of the Scottish Conservatives after they obtained a total of 31 seats. A comparative
perspective  on  Labour  and  Conservative  Party  attitudes  to  devolution  and  post-devolution
Scottish politics will shed light on the electoral demise of the former and the rising fortunes of
the  latter.  This  article  seeks  to  examine  the  main  unionist  parties’  differences  in  terms  of
structural and ideological adaptation to devolution within the broad centre-left consensus that
characterizes the current Scottish political landscape.
Si  le  vote  conservateur  s’était  raréfié  en  Ecosse  depuis  les  années  Thatcher,  les  élections
législatives écossaises de mai 2016 signalèrent une nouvelle ère avec le retour des conservateurs
et leur obtention de 31 sièges. Une perspective comparative sur les attitudes des travaillistes et
des  conservateurs  à  la  dévolution  et  à  la  nouvelle  politique  écossaise  permettra  d’apporter
certains éclairages sur la chute électorale des premiers et la réémergence des seconds. Cet article
analysera  ainsi  les  différences  entre  les  principaux  partis  unionistes  écossais  en  termes
d’adaptation structurelle  et  idéologique à la  dévolution au sein même du large consensus de
centre-gauche qui caractérise le paysage politique écossais actuel. 
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